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Discussion of Mark J. Browne's "The Definition of 
Insurance: Implications for a Health Insurance 
Demand Model" 
Charles Fuhrer* 
I would like to thank Professor Mark Browne for this contribution 
to the actuarial literature. To the best of my knowledge, actuaries 
have not written on the subject of his paper. 
I propose alternative measures of the amount of insurance to the 
author's Il, 12, and 13. These are: 
N 
Il = l ~ E[OOPd 
I J=1 J 
N 
12 = l ~ E[Bij] 
I J=1 
13 = 
I1 
where i ranges over all insured for all insurance policies. The author 
selected his definitions of measures of insurance from the literature 
and, of course, is free to define them in any way he desires. I believe 
my measures would be more useful, particularly for the purpose of the 
paper. 
My measures correspond to what would be the normal way of 
ordering policies. For example, suppose two policies A and B were 
identical except that they had $100 and $200 deductibles, respec-
tively. For my measure, A would provide more insurance than B. This 
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is the normal result because A often pays more benefits than Band 
never pays less. Under the author's definitions, if A were purchased 
by a healthier insurance than B, then A might have a lower value of 
12. Generally, I would expect that a measure of the coverage level of 
an insurance policy would be independent of the individual that 
chooses to purchase it. 
The author tries to answer whether certain factors influence the 
purchase of different amounts of insurance. Some of these factors are 
correlated directly with the demand for health care. Because his 
measures of the amount of insurance are affected by the demand for 
health care, correlations exist. An interesting question is: "Do indi-
viduals who will have a greater demand for health care services 
recognize this fact and then purchase insurance policies with greater 
reimbursement provisions?" I believe that the author fails to answer 
this question. 
Charles Fuhrer 
Washington National Insurance Co. 
300 Tower Parkway 
Lincolnshire, IL 60069-3665 
Author's Reply to Discussion 
The comments of Mr. Charles S. Fuhrer are greatly appreciated. 
His suggestion of several alternative measures of insurance is valu-
able. A primary aim of my paper was to raise the question of how to 
determine the amount of coverage an insured has. While my paper 
proposes several measures, future researchers may want to consider 
the merits of others as well. 
Fuhrer's measures of an insurance policy are "independent of the 
individual that choose to purchase it." Such measures of insurance 
emphasize the contractual provisions of a policy while failing to 
account precisely for the amou,nt of risk transferred by the policy. 
Little information on the economic value of an insurance policy to an 
individual insured can be gained from such measures. The measures, 
however, may be valuable for an insurer when examining a complete 
book of business. 
The question raised by Mr. Fuhrer, of whether individuals who 
are higher risks purchase insurance policies with greater reimburse-
ment provisions, is beyond the scope of the current study. This ques-
tion has been addressed in three prior studies. Interested readers are 
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referred to Browne (1992), Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993), and 
Browne and Doerpinghaus (1994). 
References 
Browne, M.J. "Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance 
Market." Journal of Risk and Insurance 59, 1 (1992): 13-33. 
Browne, M,J., and Doerpinghaus, H.I. "Information Asymmetries and Adverse Selection 
in the Market for Individual Medical Expense Insurance." Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 60, 2 (1993): 300-312. 
Browne, M.J., and Doerpinghaus, H.I. "Asymmetric Information and the Demand for 
Medigap Insurance." Working Paper at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
(1994). 
95 

